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The Batson Standard Remains the Applicable Test
for Stating a Claim of Jury Discrimination Under
the Fourteenth Amendment: Miller-El v. Dretke
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION - RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION - JURY SELECTION - The Supreme Court of
the United States affirmed that a petitioner alleging racial discrimination in the jury selection process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment has to meet the prima facie requirements under the Batson standard.
Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005).
On November 16, 1985, Thomas Joe Miller-El (hereinafter
"Miller-El") robbed a Holiday Inn in Dallas, Texas.' YMiller-El
bound and gagged two hotel employees and shot each twice in the
back of the head, killing one and rendering the other a paraplegic.2
During the jury selection process in his capital murder trial,
Miller-El objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes to
eliminate ten out of the eleven black venire members qualified to
serve on the jury.' Miller-El alleged that the strikes were illegitimate because they were based exclusively on the race of the panelist.4 The trial court heard evidence relating to the alleged discrimination, but denied the request for a new jury, ruling that
Miller-El had not met the burden of proof under the Swain standard.! The jury convicted Miller-El aid sentenced him to death.6
Miller-El filed an appeal.7 While the appeal was pending, the
United States Supreme Court decided Batson v. Kentucky, altering
the burden of proof required to state a cause of action un-der the
Fourteenth Amendment for discriminiation during the jury selec1. Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2322 (2005).
2. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2344 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 2322, 2325 (majority opinion).
4. Id. at 2322.
5. Id. To establish a discrimination claim under the Swain standard, the petitioner
must demonstrate a systematic exclusion of black persons through the use of poremptories
over a period of time. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965), overruled by Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
6. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2322.
7. Id.
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tion process.' Under Batson, a petitioner alleging that a prosecutor used peremptory strikes to exclude jurors on the basis of race
must make a prima facie showing that the strike was based entirely on the race of the prospective juror.9 If the petitioner makes
a prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to
present a race-neutral reason for the strike.' ° The trial court is
then charged with determining whether the petitioner demonstrated racial discrimination. 1' In light of the new standard, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case to the trial
court. 2 The trial court found that Miller-El failed to demonstrate
that the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to prevent blacks
from sitting on the jury exclusively on the basis of race. 3 The
Texas prosecutor's proffered race-neutral reasons for the strikes
were found to be "completely credible and sufficient" by the trial
court." Miller-El appealed, and the court of criminal appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling. 5
Miller-El then petitioned for federal habeas relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2254.16 The district court denied relief and the Court of'
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to issue a certificate of appealability, thereby preventing Miller-El from appealing the decision.' 7 . The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
8. Id. See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The Fourteenth Amendment
reads in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
9. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2345 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 2346.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2323 (majority opinion).
13. Id.
14. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2323.
15. Id.
16. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1996).
17. Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2323. A certificate of appealability is issued when there is a
denial of federal habeas corpus relief. BLACK'S LAW DITIMONARY 177 (7th ed. 2000). A
United States circuit judge, certifying that the prisoner showed that a constitutional right
may have been violated, issues the document. Id. The petitioner only has to prove that
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decide whether Miller-El was entitled to a review of his Batson
discrimination claim (hereinafter "Batson claim")."8 The Supreme
Court reversed the decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
and granted the certificate of appealability.1 9 The Supreme Court
found that Miller-El was entitled to a review of the Batson claim
because "reasonable jurists" could differ as to the merits of the
claim.2 ° On remand, the Fifth Circuit rejected the Batson claim on
the merits.2 1 The United States Supreme Court again granted certiorari, stating that, to obtain the requested relief, Miller-El would
have to demonstrate that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling was "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceedings." 2
Justice Souter announced the decision of the majority,2 3 explaining that racial discrimination in the jury selection process violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 4 The
Court noted that racial discrimination deprives the defendant of
the right to a trial by an impartial jury and harms minority
groups through the perpetuation of racial stereotypes.2" After reviewing the voir dire record and the evidence presented by MillerEl, the majority found that he was entitled to prevail on the merits of his Batson claim.26 The Court stated that, of the 108 men
and women who were pooled as potential jurors, twenty were
black.27 Nine of those black panelists were either excluded from
the jury by agreement of the prosecution and defense or were re-

reasonable jurists would find the claim debatable, not that they would prevail on the merits. Id. The failure to obtain a certificate of appealability precludes an appeal. Id.
18. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2323. Certiorari is 'an extraordinary writ issued by an
appellate court, at its discretion, directing a lower court to deliver the record in the case for
review." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 179 (7th ed. 2000). "The United States Supreme Court
uses certiorari to review most of the cases that it decides to hear." Id.
19. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2323.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2325. The standard of review is established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1996). The factual findings of the
trial court are presumed to be true unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (1996).
23. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2322. Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion, which was
joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. Justice Breyer
also filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, which was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. Id. at 2340, 2344.
24. Id. at 2323.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2340.
27. Id. at 2325.
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moved for cause. 2" The remaining eleven venire members were
qualified to sit on the jury, but the prosecutor used peremptory
strikes against all but one black male.29 This evidence, the Court
explained, demonstrated that the prosecution used its peremptory
strikes to exclude ninety-one percent of the potential black jurors. 30
The majority reviewed five distinct pieces of evidence presented
by Miller-El in support of his Batson claim.31 The Court began
with a side-by-side comparison of responses given by black and
white panelists to questions posed during the voir dire.32 The majority's review of the voir dire record revealed that, despite the fact
that black and white individuals gave substantially the same response to a given question, the black panelist was more likely to
33
be struck while the white panelist would be permitted to serve.
Justice Souter elaborated on this discrepancy by drawing attention to the experience of Mr. Billy Jean Fields, a black panelist
against whom the prosecution used a peremptory strike.34 The
majority noted that Mr. Fields was asked on several occasions
about his views on the death penalty.35 Mr. Fields replied that he
supported the death penalty and that he could impose it in the
present case if warranted by the evidence.3 6 On one occasion., Mr.
Fields expressed his opinion that it was possible for anyone to be
rehabilitated, but he remained adamant that this belief would not
prevent him from imposing the death penalty.37 A review of the
record further revealed that Mr. Fields' brother had a criminal
history.38 In response to questions asked by the prosecutor about

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2325.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2326.
Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2326.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Mr. Fields' testimony on the possibility of rehabilitation reads in full:
Based on what you [the prosecutor] said as far asthe crime goes, there are only
two things that could be rendered, death or life in prison. If for some reason the
testimony didn't warrant death, then life imprisonment would give an individual an opportunity to rehabilitate. But, you know, you said that the jurors
didn't have the opportunity to make a personal decision in the matter with reference to what I thought or felt, but it was just based on the questions according to the way that the law has been handed down.

38. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2327.
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his brother, Mr. Fields responded that he knew very little about
his brother's conviction and sentence and that his brother's conviction would not prevent him from being a fair and impartial juror
in the present instance.39
Justice Souter observed that Mr. Fields' unwavering support for
the death penalty would make him an ideal juror for the prosecution, but instead of allowing him to serve, the prosecutor used a
peremptory challenge to strike him.4" The prosecutor's raceneutral reason for striking Mr. Fields related to his alleged inconsistent opinions about the death penalty in light of his statement
about the possibility of rehabilitation.41 Justice Souter pointed
out, however, that the prosecutor blatantly mischaracterized the
testimony of Mr. Fields with the transparent intention of trying to
present a race neutral reason for the strike."2 When Miller-El's
attorney pointed out the inaccurate characterization of the testimony, the prosecutor quickly stated an alternative reason for the
strike, a reason that Justice Souter characterized as "ripe with
afterthought."" The majority noted that if the prosecutor was
truly concerned about Mr. Fields' views on rehabilitation, then he
should have been equally concerned about white panel members
who expressed the same views, and he should have asked further
questions to clarify the panelist's opinion." The prosecutor, however, did not act logically under the circumstances.' He did not
object to white jurists, such as Ms. Sandra Hearn, who expressed
a similar belief in the possibility of rehabilitation.46 The Court
explained that when the state fails to "engage in any meaningful
voir dire examination on a subject that the state alleges it is con-

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. The prosecutor stated:
[We] have some concern with.., his statements as to the death penalty.., he
said he could only give death if he thought a person could not be rehabilitated
and he later made the comment that any person could be [rehabilitated] if they
find God ... his religious feelings may affect his jury service in this case.
Id.
42. Id.
43. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2327. The prosecutor did not defend or withdraw his reason
for the strike when challenged. Id. at 2328. He simply offered a vague statement as to Mr.
Fields' brother's conviction as an additional reason for the strike. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. With respect to rehabilitation, Ms. Hearn stated that "people change" and that
the "evidence would have to be awful strong" in order for her to impose the death penalty.

Id.
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cerned about is evidence suggesting that the explanation is a
sham and a pretext for discrimination."4 7
Under the Batson standard, the prosecutor is given the opportunity to proffer a race-neutral reason for the strike, and the judge
then determines the plausibility of the stated reason in light of all
the relevant circumstances.4 8 According to the majority, the Batson standard presents an inherent problem because peremptories
are often used based on a gut instinct, making it difficult to explain the reason behind the strike. 9 However, where race is an
issue, the prosecutor has to articulate his reasoning, and the court
will assess its significance." If a court determines that the reason
is illegitimate, the pre-textual significance is not lessened by the
fact that the court can surmise a reason that would have been legitimate.51 In light of these principles of review, Justice Souter
concluded, on behalf of the majority, that a comparison of responses given by black panelists, who were struck, with white
panelists, who were allowed to serve, supported the conclusion
that race was the determinative factor in the use of peremptory
strikes."
The second piece of evidence that the majority examined in support of the Batson claim related to the "Texas Jury Shuffle.""3 The
Court explained that the procedure, authorized under the State's
criminal practice, allowed either the prosecution or defense to literally shuffle the jury cards with the panelists names to alter the
order in which the potential jurors were seated and, therefore, the
order in which they were questioned.54 The majority stated that,
during the selection of Miller-El's jury, the prosecution elected to
use a jury shuffle in all instances where there was a predominant
number of blacks at the forefront of the questioning line.55 Justice
Souter recounted one occasion where the prosecutor shuffled the
47. Id. at 2328 (quoting Ex parte Travis, 776 So. 2d 874, 881 (Ala. 2000)).
48. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2331.
49. Id. at 2332 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 106).
50. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2332.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2328.
53. Id. The "Texas Jury Shuffle" is authorized under TEX. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN., art.
35.11 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005). Under the statute, the court clerk is to shuffle the cards,
but in this case the record revealed that it was each side that literally shuffled the cards.
Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2333.
54. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2332. The voir dire record revealed that the prosecution
shuffled the jury cards on three separate occasions. Id. Jurors who were moved to the back
of the line for questioning were more likely to be dismissed. Id.
55. Id. at 2333.
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cards and moved a group of black panelists to the back of the line
for questioning." The defense then shuffled, and the potential
black jurors were moved back to the front. The shuffle, according
to the majority, raised suspicion because the prosecutor did not
object to the defense's shuffle until he saw the resulting racial
composition. 8 After noticing that the black panelists had returned
to the front, the prosecutor requested another shuffle, which the
Court refused to grant.59 Justice Souter concluded that since the
State failed to offer any race neutral reason for the shuffles, the
evidence suggested that impermissible racial considerations were
the motivating factor. °
The third piece of evidence assessed by the Supreme Court was
the different descriptions of the death penalty read to the jurors."
The majority's review of the voir dire record demonstrated that
when prospective jurors were asked about their views on capital
punishment, a graphic or "loaded" script was read to a higher proportion of black jurors than white jurors." Ninety-four percent of
white jurors were read the "bland" description of what imposing
the death penalty would entail, whereas only forty-seven percent
of black jurors were read the neutral script before being asked
their opinion about the death penalty.63 Miller-El alleged that the
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2333.
60. Id. The State noted in its brief that there may, indeed, have been race neutral
reasons for the shuffles, but 'no racially neutral reason has ever been offered in this case,
and nothing stops the suspicion of discriminatory intent from rising to an inference." Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. The "graphic or loaded script" reads in full:
I feel like you have a right to know right up front what our position is. Mr.
Kinne, Mr. Macaluso, and myself [the prosecutors], representing the people of
Dallas County and the State of Texas, are actively seeking the death penalty
for Thomas Joe Miller-El. We do that with the anticipation that when the
death penalty is assessed, at some point, Mr. Thomas Joe Miller-El - the man
seated right down there - will be taken down to Huntsville and will be put on
death row and at some point taken to the death house and placed on a gurney
and injected with a lethal substance until he is dead as a result of the proceedings that we have in this court on this case. So that is basically our position
going into this thing.
Id.
63. Id. at 2334. The bland or neutral script reads in full:
I feel like its only fair that we tell you our position in this case. The State of
Texas is actively seeking the death penalty in this case for Thomas Joe MillerEl. We anticipate that we will be able to present to the jury the quantity and
type of evidence sufficient to allow a jury to answer these three questions over
here in the affirmative. A yes answer to each of those questions results in an
automatic death penalty from Judge McDowell.
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different scripts were used to provoke a hesitancy to impose the
death penalty, thereby creating a neutral reason for using a peremptory strike.' The prosecutor conceded that it used different
scripts, one being more graphic than the other, but it maintained
that the reason for the different scripts was to distinguish and
eliminate those potential jurors who were not committed to an
opinion about the death penalty. 5 The majority observed, however, that the explanation offered by the prosecutor failed to correspond with the facts, as black panelists were more likely to receive
the graphic script regardless of their opinions on the death penalty.66 Only when the facts were considered in light of the prosecutor's goal to exclude blacks from sitting on the jury did the statistics make sense.67 Justice Souter observed that, of the whites
who expressed ambivalence to the death penalty, only thirty percent received the graphic script, whereas eighty-six percent of the
black panelists who expressed ambivalence received the script.6 8
The majority concluded that the evidence weighed heavily in favor
of Miller-El's allegation that the prosecutor employed the script
based on racial considerations as opposed to ambivalence about
the death penalty.69
The prosecutor's use of what the majority labeled "trick questions" was the fourth piece of evidence presented in support of
Miller-El's Batson claim.7" During the voir dire, the prosecutor
asked potential jurors to state the minimum sentence that they
would impose on an individual convicted of murder.7' The majority of the white jurors were told before they answered that the
state of Texas requires a five-year minimum sentence. 2 If the
panelist responded with a term that was above the five-year mandate, the prosecutor, while normally preferring to select harsh jurors, would claim cause to strike. 3 The State conceded that the
goal of the "trick question" was to create cause to strike 4 When
Id. at 2334.
64. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2333.
65. Id. at 2334.
66. Id. at 2335.
67. Id. at 2326.
68. Id. at 2336-37.
69. Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2337.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. Only twenty-seven percent of non-blacks were read the trick question, whereas
one-hundred percent of black jurors were read the trick question. Id. at 2338.
73. Id.
74. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2337.
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given the opportunity to state a race-neutral reason for the strike
as required by Batson, the prosecutor alleged that the minimum
sentence information was omitted in those instances where the
panelist had expressed ambivalence about the death penalty.75 As
the majority stated in response to all of the proffered race-neutral
reasons given by the State, the explanation failed to explain why
white panelists who expressed ambivalence were still informed of
the minimum sentence, whereas black jurors with the same views
were not. 6 Justice Souter pointed out that the bare statistics revealed that only twenty-seven percent of whites who expressed
similar ambivalent opinions were asked the trick question,
whereas one hundred percent of blacks with the same views were
asked the trick question.77
The fifth, and final, piece of evidence that the Supreme Court
reviewed in relation to Miller-El's Batson claim concerned the alleged practice of the Dallas County District Attorney's Office of
systematically excluding blacks from sitting on the jury." Former
District Attorneys testified that they believed the office encouraged an informal policy of excluding blacks from the jury.79 MillerEl also presented evidence relating to the prosecutor's use of a
jury selection manual entitled 'Jury Selection in a Criminal Case',
also known as the Sparling Manual, which contained an article on
why minorities should be prevented from serving on a jury. °
The Supreme Court reviewed the aforementioned evidence as a
whole in light of all the relevant circumstances, as mandated by
the Batson standard."1 The majority characterized the court of
appeals' failure to find discrimination a "dismissive and strained
interpretation" of the evidence presented. 2 Justice Souter acknowledged that there were instances where the evidence was
open to interpretation, but when the evidence was viewed as a
whole, there could be no dispute that there was indeed discrimina75. Id.
76. Id. at 2338.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2338. A Dallas County district judge testified that, when he
worked in the District Attorney's Office from the late 1950's to the early 1960's, his superior
explicitly told him that if he allowed any blacks to serve on the jury, he would be fired. Id.
Another current judge and former district attorney testified that, wlile he worked in the
office from 1976 to 1978, he believed that the office had a policy of systematically excluding
blacks from sitting on the jury. Id. at 2339.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. See also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
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tion in the jury selection process in violation of Miller-El's Fourteenth Amendment rights. 3 The Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for an
entry ofjudgment in Miller-El's favor."
Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion in which he reiterated
the concerns of Justice Thurgood Marshall, who was a member of
the Court at the time of the Batson decision.85 Both Justices expressed their fear that complex and prolonged litigation would be
the result of all Batson claims because it is difficult to find an objective test that will measure the subjective reasons underlying
the use of a peremptory strike." While the Batson standard was
an attempt by the Supreme Court to remedy this difficulty, problems are endemic.8 7 Justice Breyer explained that the prosecutor
can continue to use peremptory strikes for illegitimate reasons if
the strikes fall below the prima facie requirement.8 If the petitioner meets the prima facie requirement and the burden shifts to
the prosecutor, he must provide only a "race neutral" reason, not a
"persuasive or even plausible" reason for the strike.8 9 Finally, Justice Breyer stated that the court is given the "hopeless" task of
assessing the prosecutor's motives for exercising the strike, which
at times even the prosecutor himself is unable to articulate."0 Justice Breyer questioned how a court could possibly be asked to distinguish a legitimate reason for a strike from one that is illegitimate considering that racial bias is at times unintentional and
often unconscious. 91
Justice Breyer further called into question the need for peremptory challenges in the current legal system. 92 A modern jury system that does not use peremptories is not an unreasonable proposition, given the extensive research that has been conducted on

83. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2339.
84. Id. at 2340 (Breyer, J., concurring).
85. Id. Justice Marshall expressed his concern as to the problems of proof inherent in
the Batson standard. Id.
86. Id. Miller-El obtained and presented to various lower courts evidence demonstrating racial discrimination in the jury selection process, and yet his claim remained in the
system for seventeen years and resulted in eight different judicial opinions. Id. at 2340.
87. Id.
88. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2340 (Breyer, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 2341.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. rd. at 2342.
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the subject. Justice Breyer explained that, when "used to express stereotypical judgments about race, gender, religionz, or nadeinocratic
tional origin, peremptory challenges betray the jury's
94
function."
representative
its
undermine
origins and
The dissent, authored by Justice Thomas and joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, alleged that the majority, in
reaching its decision, improperly reviewed evidence that was
never submitted to the trial courts.95 Justice Thomas first addressed the standard of review.9" Since Miller-El was requesting
federal habeas relief from a state court judgment, the Court's review was controlled by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter "AEDPA").97 The AEDPA states
that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued unless the state
court's finding "was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented." s
Justice Thomas argued that Miller-El failed to meet the AEDPA
standard because he presented only minimal evidence to the state
courts. 99 The dissent alleged that, of the evidence that the majority reviewed, only the historical trend of racial discrimination by
the prosecutor's office was ever presented to the state courts. °0 As
a result, the majority only found that there was discrimination,
according to the dissent, because they reviewed evidence that
Miller-El failed to present to any state court.' According to Justice Thomas, the majority's willingness to go beyond the record to
review evidence never before presented, in direct violation of
93. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2342 (Breyer, J. concurring). For information detailing the
elimination of peremptory strikes from the jury system see, Raymond J. Broderick, Why the
Peremptory Challenge Should be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369 (1992); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should be Abolished: A Trial Judges Perspective, 64 U. CI-I. L.
REV. 809 (1997).
94. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2343 (Breyer, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 2344 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2345. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
99. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2345 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The only evidence presented
by Miller-El in the state courts was the juror questionnaires of the ten black venire men
who were struck by the State, excerpts from a series of newspaper articles on racial bias in
jury selection, and a manual on jury selection in criminal cases that was written by a former Dallas County prosecutor. Id. Miller-El also presented the testimony of nine witnesses, some of whom had worked in the Dallas County District Attorneys Office. Id. The
testimony failed to establish that the office had ever officially sanctioned racial discrimination or that the prosecutors in Miller-El's case had used racial discriminatory techniques.
Id.
100. Id. at 2347.
101. Id.
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AEDPA, was indefensible.' °2 For example, the majority attempted
to justify its reliance on the voir dire records by arguing that they
were before the state courts as a reference.0 3 Justice Thomas
flatly rejected this argument, observing that the State had no reaThe dissent asson or opportunity to leaf through the record.'
to the
presented
never
were
serted that, since the questionnaires
0
state court, they were not part of the reviewable record.' Justice
Thomas stressed that it was Miller-El's burden to demonstrate
racial discrimination by clear and convincing evidence.' 6 The dissent concluded that Miller-El failed to meet this burden and it was
only through the majority's improper inclusion of the juror questionnaires that Miller-El was able to satisfy the prima facie requirement."7
Justice Thomas argued in the alternative that even if the evidence was properly within the Court's scope of review, Miller-El
still failed to establish a prima facie case under the Batson stanThe dissent first focused on the majority's side-by-side
dard.'
comparison of black and white jurors, concluding that the majority
selected those examples favorable to Miller-El's case, while ignoring specific instances where whites with similar views were
struck, as these would not support Miller-El's claim.0 9 In response to the majority's analysis of the disparate questioning of
black and white jurors, the dissent stated that a review of the voir
dire record revealed that only those individuals who expressed
ambivalence about the death penalty received either the graphic
script or were asked the "trick" minimum sentence question."0
The dissent dismissed the evidence of the Texas Jury Shuffle as
"mere speculation.""' Justice Thomas stated that only an inference could be drawn from the shuffle, which fails to meet the clear
and convincing standard required by the law.1' 2 Justice Thomas
102. Id. "Federal courts sitting in habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts
and issues which a prisoner made insufficient evidence to pursue in state proceedings." Id.
103. Id.
104. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2350 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2351.
109. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2355 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 2358. Justice Thomas noted that, of the seven (7) black venire members who
did not receive the script, six took a definite stand either for or against the death penalty.
Id.
111. Id. at 2361.
112. Id. at 2362.
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concluded by addressing the alleged history of the Dallas County
District Attorneys Office of engaging in racial discrimination."3
Such allegations, according to the dissent, amounted to nothing
more then "guilt by association," as there was no evidence that
any of the prosecutors ever read the Sparling Manual.1 14
Justices Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, determined that Miller-El failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence a claim of racial discriminatioin in the jury
selection process under the Batson standard.'
The dissent observed that the majority only concluded that Miller-El was entitled to the certificate of appealability by reviewing evidence not
presented in the Texas state courts, thus violating the AEDPA."'
Thus, 7 the dissent found that Miller-El was not entitled to the
1
writ.
As early as 1880 in the case of Strauder v. West Virginia,1 8 the
Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether every citizen of
the United States has a right to a trial by a jury selected without
regard to race or color." 9 The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents a state from
systematically excluding persons from serving on a jury solely because of their race or color. 2 ° Justice Strong recognized that while
the petitioner is not entitled to demand that members of his race
be placed on the jury, a state is not allowed to systematically deny
members of the petitioner's race from serving as panelists. 2 ' The
Court grounded its holding in the Fourteenth Amendment, which
forbids a state to "make or enforce any laws which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
113. Id.
114. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2363 (Thomas, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the
manual only contained one racially stereotypical line on race: "Minority races almost always empathize with the Defendant." Id. at 2362.
115. Id. at 2363.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). The plaintiff in Strauder was a black man who was tried and
convicted for murder. Id. He filed a writ of error claiming that he was denied the rights to
which he was entitled under the United States Constitution. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304.
119. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304.
120. Id. Strauder was one of the first cases applying the Fourteexnth Amendment to
racial discrimination. Id. at 309-10.
121. Id. at 309. The Court stated, "the very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of
the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that
is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal %statusin society as
that which he holds." Id.
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without due process of the law."'22 The Court emphasized that the
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to ensure that different
races enjoy the same treatment before the government and the
law as white individuals. 123 If all individuals are to have equal
rights under the law, the Court concluded that it must hold the
West Virginia statute that denies black citizens the right to participate in the legal system as jurors unconstitutional as an outright violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.'24 Strauder firmly
established the law,
and United States courts have consistently
25
upheld the rule. 1

While the Court in Strauder clearly announced the law, United
States courts have struggled to clarify what evidence would substantiate a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in the jury
selection process. 12 In Martin v. State of Texas, the Court began
to elucidate the standard by elaborating upon what was insufficient to state a claim. 127 The petitioner, a black male charged with
murder, moved to quash the jury on the grounds that qualified
blacks had been denied from serving as panelists because of their
race.128

The Court in Martin. reaffirmed the principles announced in
Strauder: Whenever the Government denies members of a group
the right to serve on a jury solely because of their race or color,
there is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 Martin, however, was denied relief because he failed to present evidence that
demonstrated that blacks were discriminated against because of
their race or color. 3 ' The Court stated that Martin merely presented the written motions alleging discrimination, which the
State directly controverted.'
Unable to assume that the facts
122. Id. at 305-06. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
123. Strauder,100 U.S. at 306.
124. Id. at 309.
125. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
126. Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906).
127. 200 U.S. at 319-20.
128. Martin, 200 U.S. at 318. Martin was arraigned, and he pleaded not guilty to the
charges. Id. He then moved to quash the indictment on the grounds that black individuals
had been denied the right to serve on the jury because of their race despite the fact that
they represented twenty-five percent of the population "competent under the law to act as
grand jurors" in the county. Id. When the motion was denied, Martin moved to quash the
petit jury on the grounds that qualified blacks had been denied from serving because of
their race. Id. The court overruled the motion, and Martin was found guilty of first-degree
murder and sentenced to death. Id.
129. Id. at 319.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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averred by Martin were true, the Court concluded that the fact
that no members of the petitioner's race served on the jury is insufficient evidence to sustain a claim of discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment.12 Justice Harlan noted that the mere
fact that no members of the petitioner's race served on the jury
does not constitute prima facie evidence of discrimination.13 The
accused has a right to a jury that has not been discriminated
against because of race or color; he does not have a right to a
mixed jury.' The Court's decision elaborating on what was insufficient to state a cause of action for discrimination during the jury
selection process proved to be of little guidance for the courts, resulting in a change of focus in the case law.'35
Hernandez v. Texas was one of the first cases where the Court
was forced to clearly articulate the burden of proof.'36 In Hernandez, the petitioner, convicted of murder and sentenced to life in
prison, moved to quash the indictment on the grounds that individuals of Mexican descent were systematically excluded from
serving on the jury."' Recognizing that it is a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to discriminate based on race or color, the
Court stated that the initial burden rests on the petitioner to
prove that he is a member of a cognizable racial group.13 If the
petitioner can prove that he is a member of the group, he then has
to demonstrate that there was indeed discrimination-"' Discrimination, the Court said, can be evidenced by proof that the racial
group constitutes a substantial population of the area, that individuals were qualified for service, and yet that none had been
called for service or actually served on a jury."' The State is then
given the opportunity to rebut the evidence presented by the petiThe prosecutor, however, cannot rely on general assertioner.'
tions that he was merely performing his duty to rebut the peti132.

Id.

133. Martin, 200 U.S. at 320-21.
134. Id. at 320-21.
135. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
136. Hernandez,347 U.S. at 479-82.
137. Id. Hernandez alleged that he was denied equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 477. The motion to quash was denied by the court. Id.
138. Id. at 478. Such a showing can be made by demonstrating the attitude of a community. Id. at 479. For example, in Hernandez the Court noted that signs in business
windows stating that Mexicans will not be served demonstrated the comnnunity's sentiment
that they are a distinct group. Id.
139. Id. at 480.
140. Id. (citing Norris v. State of Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935)).
141. Hernandez,347 U.S. at 481.
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tioner's claims. 4 2 In H-fernandez, the Court concluded that the petitioner met the burden of proof, and thus the judgment was re-

versed. 141
The case of Swain v. Alabama 144 set the standard for proving
jury discrimination that would be followed by the courts for the
next twenty-one years. 145 In Swain, the Court was forced to decide, among other issues, whether a black defendant was denied
the equal protection of the laws when a prosecutor used peremptory strikes to exclude members of his race from serving on the
jury.'46 The defendant, Robert Swain, after being convicted of rape
in Alabama, alleged that the prosecutors had used peremptory
strikes to systematically exclude blacks from serving on the jury,
thus depriving him of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. 47
In reaching the conclusion that the defendant failed to meet the
burden of proof, the Court explained the nature of the Alabama
jury system and the crucial role and purpose that the peremptory
strike plays in that system.14 In an attempt to secure an impartial jury, the Alabama strike system allows an individual to be
removed from the venire panel without explanation or judicial
scrutiny.4 4 The Court roted, and was persuaded by the argument,
that the basic nature of the peremptory strike is one that is used
"without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control.""' A prosecutor often decides to exercise the strike on the basis of "sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices." 5 ' If the prosecutor's reasons for electing to pursue a strike are called into question, the peremptory strike would
"collapse" into the challenge for cause and be rendered useless. 52
142. Id.
143. Id. at 482.
144. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
145. Swain, 380 U.S. at 226.
146. Id. at 203-04.
147. Id. at 203. Swain filed motions to quash the indictment, to strike the trial jury
venire, and to declare the petit jury void on the basis of alleged invidious discrimination
depriving Swain of the equal protection of the laws. Id. The Circuit Court of Talladega
On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the
County denied the motions. Id.
conviction, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id.
148. Id. at 211. Alabama follows the common law system of trial by an impartial jury of
twelve individuals who must reach a unanimous verdict. Id. Employed within this system
are challenges for cause, and, instead of the common law peremptory challenges, a system
of strikes. Id.
149. Id. at 212.
150. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
151. Id. (quoting Lewis v. United States, 14 U.S. 370 (1816)).
152. Id. at 222.
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The Court relied on this reasoning to hold that the striking of
black panelists in a particular case is not a violation of the FourJustice White analogized that, just as a
teenth Amendment.'
particular racial group can be removed, so can a particular reliThe
gious group in the search for a fair and impartial jury.'
case,
that,
in
each
the
presumption
rely
on
Court was content to
uses the strikes legitimately to secure an impartial
the prosecutor
55
jury.
The Swain case, however, presented a larger issue to the Court:
Not only were blacks denied the right to serve on the jury in
Swain's case, but they had never served on a petit jury in the hisThe Court recognized that peremptory
tory of the county.'
strikes were being used to obtain the illegitimate end of systematic discrimination.'57 The Court, drawing on Hernandez, affirmed
that to present a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection
of venire members, the petitioner has to demonstrate that he is a
member of a cognizable racial group, that the group constitutes a
substantial part of the population, that members of the group
were qualified to serve as jurors, and yet none had been called for
service over an extended period of time.' 5 The Court extended the
holding in Hernandez by ruling that, when it is alleged that the
discrimination occurs through the use of peremptory challenges,
the petitioner has to additionally demonstrate that the prosecutor
systematically used the strikes over a period of time to exclude a
racial group.'59 In light of the newly established burden of proving
discrimination over time, the Court concluded that Swain failed to
make a prima facie case. 6 5
Since expounding the requirements of a prima facie case for discrimination in the jury selection process, courts across the United
States have rigidly applied the rules. 6 ' In United States v. Pearson, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was called upon to

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 220-22.
Id. at 222.
Swain, 380 U.S. at 222.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 227.
Swain, 380 U.S. at 228.
United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1218 (5th Cir. 1971).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 44

apply the rule from Swain, and determine whether the defendants
had met the burden of proof.162
The defendants in Pearson alleged that the prosecutor had employed his peremptory strikes in a discriminatory manner to prevent blacks from serving on the jury. 6 ' Interpreting Swain, the
Fifth Circuit explicitly stated that a claim of discrimination cannot
be sustained by demonstrating that the prosecutor struck a minority group in any one case."M However, a case for discrimination can
be made if the petitioner can demonstrate systematic exclusion of
a racial group over.time. 6 The defendants attempted to meet this
burden by calling the prosecutor to testify as to his motives for
exercising the peremptory strikes. 66 The prosecutor's records from
the week the defendants were tried demonstrated that when the
defendant was white, the prosecutor allowed blacks to remain on
the panel, but when the defendant was black, the prosecutor removed as many blacks as possible.'67 The Court concluded that the
evidence was consistent with a claim of discrimination; however, it
explained that a showing that is "too slender" will not overcome
the presumption that the prosecutors faithfully exercised their
duties.'
As a result, the defendants did not prevail, and there
rernained to be a successful discrimination claim under the Swain
standard, raising doubts about the feasibility of the burden of
proof.169
162. Pearson, 448 F.2d at 1214. The defendants in Pearsonwere stopped for a traffic
violation. Id. at 1209. Upon noticing a suspicious duffle bag, one of the officers asked the
individual in the back seat to reveal its contents. Id. at 1210. The bag contained various
"burglary tools." Id. at 1209. Rifles were found in the back seat, and the car had been stolen. rd. at 1210. The defendants were both charged with violations of the Dryer Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2312, and one was charged with transporting firearms in interstate commerce
after being convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Id. at 1208. The court of appeals
revie'wed the case and examined whether the search of the car that revealed the "burglary
tools" was lawful, and, as relevant here, whether the state had a systematic policy of excluding minority jurors from serving on criminal cases. Id. at 1209-13. The court concluded that the search of the car and the seizure of the weapons was lawful. Id. at 1213.
163- Id. at 1213-14.
164- Id. "[1It is permissible to insulate from inquiry the removal of Negroes from a particulax jury on the assumption that the prosecutor is acting on acceptable considerations
related to the case he is trying, the particular defendant involved and the particular crime
charged." Id. (quoting Swain, 380 U.S. at 223).
165. Pearson,448 F.2d at 1214.
166. Id. at 1216.
167- Id. Since the prosecutor -was not required to keep records of his conduct, he could
only present his notes for the week he tried the defendants. Id. The Court recognized that
the failure to present additional evidence was not the result of the defendant's lack of effort. Id. at 1217.
168. Id. at 1218.
169- Id.
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The holding in Swain was explicitly overruled by the Supreme
Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, thereby establishing the
current burden of proof required to state a cause of action for discrimination in the jury selection process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 170 In Batson, the Court was forced to re-evaluate the
burden of proof placed on a criminal defendant claiming that he
had been denied the equal protection of the laws through a state's
use of peremptory strikes. 71 Batson, indicted for second-degree
burglary and receipt of stolen property, moved to discharge the
jury after the prosecution used its peremptory strikes to exclude
all blacks from serving as panelists.'7 2 The trial judge dismissed
the claims, asserting that peremptory challenges can be used to
strike anyone. 7 3 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held
that Swain v. Alabama eliminated the possibility of an equal protection claim based on the prosecutor's conduct in a single case. 74
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court in Batson explicitly rejected the holding in Swain. 7 ' The majority noted that requiring the petitioner to prove systematic discrimination o'ver time
imposed a "crippling" burden of proof, which only served to insulate prosecutors from scrutiny as to their acts.16 A consistent pattern of racial discrimination was no longer a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 77
The Court in Batson held that the petitioner can make a prima
facie showing of discrimination by presenting evidence from the
petitioner's own trial. 78 To make a prima facie showing, the petitioner has to first demonstrate that he is a member of a cognizable
racial group, and that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges
to remove from the venire panel members of the petitioner's
170. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
171. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82-83.
172. Id. at 83. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury, alleging that the defendant's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments had been violated. Id. The
defendant's claim under the Sixth Amendment stated that he was denied a jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community, and his Fourteenth Amendment claim was based on
a violation of the equal protection of the laws. Id.
173. Id. at 83.
174. Id. at 83-85.
175. Id. at 93. "[Alconsistent pattern of official racial discrimination" is not "a necessary
predicate to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. A single invidiously discriminatory
governmental act" is not "immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making
of other comparable decisions." Id. at 95 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Department Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
176. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93.
177. Id. at 95.
178. Id. at 96.
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race.17 The petitioner then must show that the facts and any
other relevant circumstances rise to the inference that the prosecutor used the strikes to exclude panelists solely on the basis of
race."'0 If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing, the burden
then shifts to the state to present race neutral reasons for striking
The trial court is then charged with the duty of
the panelist.'
determining whether there has been purposeful discrimination.'82
If the trial court finds that the facts establish that the prosecutor
discriminated, precedent requires that the conviction be overturned. 8 '
While the Court in Batson announced what it thought was a
clear statement of the law, courts have struggled with the application of the standard."' Purkett v. Elem is one of the many cases
that the Supreme Court heard after Batson in an attempt to clarThe respondent in Purkett, on trial for secondify the standard.
degree robbery, objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory
strikes to remove two black men from the panel.'88 The prosecutor
explained the strikes, grounding them on the appearance of the
jurors ("the mustaches and the beards look suspicious to me").'87
On appeal, the court of appeals interpreted Batson to require that,
where the prosecutor strikes a member of the petitioner's racial
group "solely on the basis of factors which are facially irrelevant"
to the ability of the individual to serve on the jury, the prosecutor
has to articulate a plausible race-neutral reason for their belief
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. The prosecutor's explanation does not have to rise to the
level of justifying his exercise for a challenge for cause. Id. The State, however, cannot rest
its claim on the belief that the potential juror will be biased merely because they are the
same race as the petitioner. Id.
182. Id. at 95.
183. Id. at 100.
184. Purkett v. Elem, 5 14 U.S. 765, 767-69 (1995).
185. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767.
186. Id. at 766.
187. Id. The prosecutor stated in full:
I struck [juror] number twenty-two because of his long hair. He had long curly
hair. He had the longest hair of anybody on the panel by far. He appeared to
me to not be a good juror for that fact, the fact that he had long hair hanging
down shoulder length, curly, unkempt hair. Also, he had a mustache and a
goatee type beard. And juror number twenty-four also has a mustache and a
goatee type beard. Those are the only two people on the jury... with the facial
hair ... And I don't like the way they looked, with the way the hair is cut, both
of them. And the mustaches and the beards look suspicious to me.
Id. (alteration on original). The prosecutor was also concerned about juror number twentyfour's first hand experience of being a robbery victim. Id.
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that those factors will affect the jurors ability to serve on the
case. 188
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court stated that Batson's second step does not require a persuasive or even plausible
explanation.18 9 The Supreme Court concluded that it was error for
the court of appeals to merge steps two and three and require that
the explanation be persuasive.19 ° When the Court in Batson stated
that the prosecutor has to give a "clear and reasonably specific
explanation of his legitimate reason" for using the strike, the
Court intended "legitimate reason" to mean a reason that does not
deny equal protection. 9 ' At the second stage of the inquiry, the
reason does not have to "make sense" or even be reasonable.'92
Rather, the court is merely to examine the genuineness of the motive.'93 Thus, the prosecutor's explanation as to the unkempt look
of the
two jurors was sufficient to rebut the claim of discrimina194
tion.

A review of the case law demonstrates that the courts have
slowly been eroding the traditional peremptory challenge, spurning much literature on the continued validity of the peremptory
strike and the effectiveness of the Batson standard.' 9' Few Batson
claims have been successful in the years since the Supreme Court
announced the decision. 9 ' The ability of prosecutors to "play the
game" and proffer pre-textual race-neutral explanations has
raised the question as to whether the Batson standard is merely
"illusory protection.""' The peremptory challenge, it has been argued, has been reduced to a "quasi-peremptory challenge," where
the courts are all too willing to accept "vague and subjective" explanations to rebut the petitioner's prima facie case. '
Unless
188. Id. at 767. The trial court overruled the objection, a finding that was later affirmed
by the Missouri Court of Appeals. Id. at 766. Respondent then filed a petition for habeas
corpus, but the district court denied the claim, stating that the finding that there was no
discrimination was presumed to be correct. Id. at 766-67. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. Id. at 767.
189. Id. at 767-68.
190. Purkett,514 U.S. at 768.
191. Id. at 768-69.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Eric N. Einhorn, Note, Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Is
the PeremptoryChallenge Still Preeminent?,36 B.C. L. REV. 161, 199 (1994).
196. Einhorn, supra note 195, at 187. 113 Batson claims have come before the federal
courts, and only five have been successful in the years from 1986 to 1994. Id. at 189.
197. Id. at 187-88.
198. Id. at 187.
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there is an inhereatly discriminatory intent, the trial court is
likely to accept the race-neutral explanation.'9 9 Thus, the standard relies not on the proffered reason, but the court's "impression
of the demeanor of the attorney who exercised the challenge."0 0
While an attorney's act is no longer insulated from scrutiny, the
burden they have to meet is minimal.2 °' In effect, Batson only requires that the prosecutor who wishes to strike on the basis of an
impermissible consideration such as race "find creative explanations for the strike and to seem credible when advancing those
explanations."2 2
One of the implications of Miller-El's case seems to be that complex, prolonged, and costly litigation is likely to result from the
problems inherent in applying the Batson standard. Miller-El's
protracted struggle through the legal system - seventeen years of
litigation spurning eight different judicial opinions - illuminates
the difficulties the courts have had in applying the standard. 3
These concerns were first announced by Justice Marshall at the
time of the Batson decision, and later echoed by Justice Breyer in
his concurrence in the case at bar. 20 4 The difficulties can be traced
to the problems endemic in trying to develop and apply a standard
that seeks to impose an objective measure on the subjective processes involved in the execution of a peremptory strike.
The problems the courts have had in applying the law seem to
stem from the difficulty in developing a standard for proving jury
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment that will impose
a reasonable burden of proof on the petitioner, and also serve as a
definitive -test for the courts to follow. A review of the case law
reveals that, while the progress has been slow, there has been an
improvement. Of particular importance was the Supreme Court's
abandonment of the Swain standard. The Court recognized the
near impossible burden of proof placed on the petitioner when required to prove a pattern and history of discrimination. 20 5 The
199. Id. United States circuit courts have accepted explanations relating to employment, education, age, housing, marital status, crimes, employment of relatives, appearance,
language skills, eye contact, intuition, and inattentiveness. Id. at 191-94.
200. Id. at 189. "Thus a large portion of Batson challenges come down to the credibility
of the attorney who proffered the explanation rather than the adequacy of the explanation
at law." Id.
201. Einhorn, supra note 195, at 197.
202. Id.
203. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2340.
204. Id.
205. Swain, 380 U.S. at 226.
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Batson standard eased the burden placed on the petitioner, but
drastically increased the burden placed on prosecutors anid the
courts. In developing the Batson standard, the Supreme Court did
not resolve the difficulty; it merely shifted the burden onto the
legal system. The struggle for a final resolution in Miller-El's case
is an indication that the Batson standard may not be as effective a
test as the Supreme Court hoped.
A large part of the difficulty in applying the test derives from
the burden-shifting analysis. Under Batson, the prosecutor is required to state a race neutral reason for his use of a given peremptory strike.2 6 Various difficulties are apparent. First, as noted by
Justice Breyer, all the prosecutor must do is present a raceneutral reason, not one that is plausible, persuasive, or even reasonable." 7 This requirement is extremely easy to meet: A savvy
prosecutor can merely derive a reason that the court would be
willing to accept and articulate it in such a manner as to convince
the court. 0 8 The result is that the test becomes illusory.2 "9 Second,
it is arguable that the Batson test fails to actually probe the prosecutor's motives and intentions. In deciding whether to exercise a
peremptory strike, the prosecutor draws on past experiences, gut
instincts, and stereotypes. In many instances, theses reasons are
unconscious to the prosecutor in that he is unaware of why he decides to exercise the strike in a particular case. The inability to
articulate a true reason further encourages fabrication. Finally, it
is highly unlikely that the prosecutor will ever admit to striking a
prospective panelist on the basis of an impermissible consideration such as race. Thus, the prosecutor will articulate a reason
that he hopes the court will accept as race-neutral. The court is
then given the distasteful task of assessing whether a member of
its own profession is telling the truth about his motivations. If the
court is reluctant to deem a member of the legal profession, in essence, a liar, then there is an increased likelihood that the court
will be willing to accept the proffered reason.
Additional difficulties can be found in the role delegated to the
court to assess the legitimacy of the alleged race-neutral reason
for the prosecutor's exercise of the peremptory strike. It is, without a doubt, the province of the courts to hear, weigh, and assess
206. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
207. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2341 (Breyer, J., concurring).
208. Einhorn, supra note 195, at 197.
209. Id. at 187.
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the evidence presented in order to ascertain the truth of the matter. While the courts are placed in precisely this role in terms of
the Batson standard, additional difficulties arise. The court is
given the "hopeless" task of assessing the prosecutor's motives for
exercising the strike.20 How is the judge supposed to assess the

legitimacy of a reason that the prosecutor himself may be unable
to articulate?2

11

If bias is often unintentional and unconscious,

how can a court reasonably be expected to distinguish legitimate
strikes from ones that are illegitimate? As the case suggests, if
prosecutors can be subject to unintentional bias, how can the petitioner be sure that the judge does not harbor similar tendencies?
These difficulties in applying the Batson standard are brought
to light by the Supreme Court's decision in Miller-El. Of note is
the fact that there is no general issue resolved by the Supreme
Court in the case. The Court does not clarify or alter the Batson
standard; it merely applies the facts of the case to the law, a function usually reserved for the lower courts. Given the absence of a
general legal issue applicable beyond the case at bar, it is peculiar
that the Supreme Court elected to grant certiorari in this particular instance. Miller-El could be a signal that there are to be many
more cases like it in the future. Since the evidence presented in
this type of discrimination case is subjective and open to interpretation, where "reasonable minds" could easily differ, there is likely
to be a long drawn out appeals process, resulting in high costs to
all parties involved and a waste of judicial resources.
Despite the difficulties in applying the Batson standard, the majority properly applied the standard to the facts of Miller-El's case.
The question is whether the Supreme Court should have done
more to stem the possibility of similar lengthy litigation in the
future. To do so would require, at minimum, a new standard, but
this seems to do little in terms of resolving the difficulties. As
previously noted by Justice Breyer in his concurrence in the case
at bar, and by Justice Marshall at the time that the Batson decision was announced, an objective standard that measures subjective decisions will never be adequate.21 The solution, as Justice
Breyer suggested, may lie in the elimination of the peremptory
strike from the legal system. 12 Peremptory strikes are not a right
210.
211.
212.
213.

Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2341 (Breyer, J., concurring).

Id.
Id. at 2340.
Id. at 2342.
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guaranteed by the Constitution, and their continued use appears
to have more to do with their long history as opposed to necessity. 14 In all the literature and research done on the peremptory
challenge, there is no "actual evidence to suggest that the peremptory effectively encourages fair trial values by eliminating biased
venire members."2 1 ' Instead, the use of peremptory strikes is a
covert way for the prosecutor to express bias, whether racial or
otherwise, and obtain a jury he thinks most favorable to the government. Thus, rather than being used to obtain an impartial
jury, the peremptory strike is used to obtain a partial jury.
Arguably, the courts have already "eliminated" the peremptory
strike through decisions such as Batson and the application of
that standard in cases like Miller-El. The peremptory challenge
is, by definition, "an arbitrary and capricious right" that is intended to provide for the exclusion of a given venire member on
the basis of "sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices"
based on the "bare looks and gestures of another."2 16 By requiring
prosecutors to explain their reasoning for striking a given individual, the courts have taken away the arbitrary nature of the strike.
What remains is little more than a "quasi-peremptory strike.""'
The peremptory strike has practically collapsed into the challenge
for cause, perhaps eliminating any remaining need for the peremptory strike.
The case of Miller-El v. Dretke demonstrates that Batson has resulted in additional, complicated, and costly litigation. While the
Batson standard eased the burden placed on petitioners when alleging racial discrimination in the jury selection process, the burden has only been shifted to the legal system. Attorneys and
judges are now required to spend time and resources litigating not
the merits of the case, but whether the reason given by the prosecutor was a pretext for discrimination. The Supreme Court could
have eliminated much future litigation by drawing on the experience of Miller-El and using it as an opportunity to eliminate the
already weakened peremptory strike from the judicial system. As
Justice Goldberg noted in his dissent in Swain, "were it necessary
to make an absolute choice between the right of a defendant to
have a jury chosen in conformity with the requirements of the
214. Id.
215. Raymond J. Broderick, Comment, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 369,409 (1992).
216. Broderick, supra note 215, at 401.
217. Einhorn, supra note 195, at 187.
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Fourteenth Amendment and the right to challenge peremptorily,
2 18
the Constitution compels choice of the former."
DianaL. Garguilo

218.

Swain, 380 U.S. at 244 (Goldberg J., dissenting).

